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On 15 December 1915, the 55-year-old veterinarian Paul Tempé from Colmar in 
Upper Alsace undertook the long journey to Berlin to receive treatment for rabies at 
the Robert Koch Institute. The day before his departure, Colmar police informed po-
lice headquarters in Berlin of  Tempé’s imminent arrival, adding that he was ‘politically 
highly suspicious’ and needed to be placed under close surveillance.1 On 20 December, 
the Berlin police noted in a report that according to Tempé’s landlady in Berlin, Helene 
Riebke, Tempé had behaved in a ‘suspicious manner’, spending ‘all of  his time out and 
about visiting the sights of  Berlin’. Tempé had told Riebke that all his relatives lived 
in France and that ‘the Germans would all become French one day’. The report went 
on to say that Riebke ‘does not wish to host Tempé any longer, because he appears 
suspicious to her and also writes many letters’.2 It concluded that Tempé might be a 
spy and was to be arrested immediately. Since there was no hard evidence and thus no 
grounds within normal criminal ‘law’; ‘procedure’? for carrying out such an arrest, the 
Berlin police took Tempé into ‘protective custody’ (Schutzhaft). Tempé was released on 
7 January 1916 and returned to Colmar—only to be placed once more in protective 
custody there one month later. In March 1916, Tempé was expelled to the German 
interior, first to Schwerte and then on to Münster and Halle, where he stayed until his 
release in January 1919.
The case of  Paul Tempé is typical of  the multilayered identities found in many, if  
not most, inhabitants of  early twentieth-century Alsace-Lorraine.3 Tempé had been 
born in French Colmar in 1860, ten years prior to the Franco-Prussian war. Following 
the German annexation of  Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, Tempé’s father decided to move 
the family across the border to France, expecting Alsace-Lorraine to return to France 
within five years. When this did not happen, the family moved back to Colmar, accom-
modating to German rule. Paul Tempé studied veterinary medicine in Stuttgart and 
later settled down in Colmar. According to his own statement, which he made while 
detained in Halle in the German interior in April 1918, he got along well with German 
 * I would like to thank André Keil, Ara Keys and Matthew Stibbe and for their insightful comments on earlier drafts 
of this article.
 1 Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe (henceforth GLA Karlsruhe), 456 F9 390, Colmar police to Berlin police headquar-
ters, 14 Dec. 1915. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
 2 GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F9 390, police report, 20 Dec. 1915, signed Mützlitz.
 3 See, among many others, A. Wahl and J.-C. Richez, L’Alsace entre France et Allemagne, 1850–1950 (Paris, 1993), 
pp. 241–57; C. J. Fischer, Alsace to the Alsatians? Visions and Divisions of Alsatian Regionalism, 1870–1939 (New 
York, 2010); F. Roth, Alsace Lorraine: Histoire d’un pays perdu: De 1870 à nos jours (Nancy, 2010); A. Carrol, The 
Return of Alsace to France, 1918–1939 (Oxford, 2018), chap. 1.
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public servants and army personnel. Tempé further stated that he had a son fighting 
in the German army and that as an amateur viticulturist selling his produce on the 
German market, he had an economic stake in German victory. Like many Alsatians and 
Lorrainers, he described himself  as a non-political person with no strong sympathies for 
either France or Germany. For him, his arrest was the result of  a ‘misunderstanding’.4
The German military authorities who ruled wartime Alsace-Lorraine under mar-
tial law saw the multilayered identities of  the population as a threat to national unity 
in wartime.5 They sought to handle national ambivalence by arresting and removing 
persons of  doubtful national allegiance from the provinces. On 26 April 1915, Hans 
Gaede, the commander of  the army detachment stationed in Upper Alsace, outlined 
the military’s rationale:
The struggle against activities amounting to high treason, anti-German utterances and attitudes, and foreign 
characteristics requires the permanent active and determined work and assistance of  all military and civilian 
authorities. We need to emphasize the German idea more fiercely in Upper Alsace than elsewhere. The efforts 
of  the Army High Command, which is responsible for the order and security of  this territory, are driven by the 
fundamental principle that Upper Alsace is to be quickly cleansed of  all unreliable elements.6
Lack of  evidence often required the military authorities to circumvent conventional 
legal procedures. In such cases, they made use of  protective custody, which permitted 
military personnel and police to arrest and detain suspect civilians without evidence 
or trial if  they presented a danger to public safety.7 In the German interior, protective 
custody primarily affected Spartacists, Social Democrats and other political enemies—
Rosa Luxemburg is perhaps the most prominent victim of  this form of  detention. In 
large towns such as Berlin, the authorities also increasingly targeted persons at the 
margins of  society, such as the homeless, prostitutes or common criminals.8 In marked 
contrast to the German interior, however, in Alsace-Lorraine police and military au-
thorities used protective custody chiefly to combat what they saw as a nationalist threat 
to the German war effort, namely anti-German agitation.9 In this borderland setting, 
 4 See Tempé’s appeal against his continued imprisonment, GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F9 390, 12 Apr. 1918.
 5 The term used to describe the nature of the military administration was ‘state of siege’ (Belagerungszustand).
 6 GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F3 97, memorandum written by Hans Gaede, 26 Apr. 1915.
 7 ‘Protective custody’ has its roots in the Prussian Law for the Protection of Personal Freedom of 12 Feb. 1850, 
which, in the spirit of the 1848 revolution, actually sought to limit the power of police and military author-
ities. See R.  J. Evans, ‘Literaturbericht: Polizei, Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1700–1933’, Geschichte 
und Gesellschaft, 22, 4 (1996), pp.  609–28, here p.  618; D. Glorius, Im Kampf mit dem Verbrechertum: die 
Entwicklung der Berliner Kriminalpolizei von 1811 bis 1925. Eine rechtshistorische Betrachtung (Berlin, 2016), 
pp. 152–6. For the original text of the law of 12 Feb. 1850 see ‘Gesetz zum Schutze der persönlichen Freiheit. 
Vom 12. Februar 1850’, in Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preußischen Staaten (Berlin, 1850), pp. 45–8, 
available online at http://www.verfassungen.de/preussen/gesetze/persfreiheit50.htm.
 8 See A. Keil and M. Stibbe, ‘Ein Laboratorium des Ausnahmezustands: Schutzhaft während des Ersten Weltkriegs 
und in den Anfangsjahren der Weimarer Republik—Preußen und Bayern 1914 bis 1923’, Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte, 68, 4 (2020), pp. 535–73, https://doi.org/10.1515/vfzg-2020-0035.
 9 Members of the Danish and Polish minorities in the northern and eastern border regions were also affected by ar-
rests during the war, see J. Boysen, ‘Kriegserfahrung als nationale Identitätsstifterin? Ethnische Polen und Dänen als 
preußische Soldaten’, in O. Überegger (ed.), Minderheiten-Soldaten: Ethnizität und Identität in den Armeen des Ersten 
Weltkriegs (Paderborn, 2018), pp. 69–83, here p. 81. Yet in the absence of more in-depth studies of this issue, it is 
difficult to make systematic comparisons to the situation in Alsace-Lorraine. More fruitful comparisons can be made 
to the situation in Austria-Hungary, where military authorities engaged in similar campaigns of mass arrests of ‘na-
tionally suspect’ civilians in the border zones with Italy, Serbia and Russia. See L. Cole, ‘Questions of Nationalization in 
the Habsburg Monarchy’, in N. Wouters and L. van Ypersele (eds), Nations, Identities and the First World War: Shifting 
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protective custody became a tool with which military authorities sought to shape na-
tional attitudes and enforce national loyalty. In this location arbitrary measures against 
the civilian population flourished, undermining the rule of  law. For many Alsatians 
and Lorrainers, but also for liberal and left-wing critics of  ‘Prussian militarism’ across 
Germany, protective custody would become the symbol of  a repressive military regime 
that attempted to impose loyalty and discipline on a recalcitrant population.
At its western border, Germany faced the political competition of  France, which had de-
clared the return of  the ‘lost provinces’ its only public war aim.10 In arresting and expelling 
allegedly pro-German Alsatian civilians, the French authorities in the small strip of  Alsatian 
territory they held throughout the war partly mirrored the actions of  their German counter-
parts. French policy and propaganda was primarily aimed, however, at courting Alsatians and 
Lorrainers and encouraging them to enlist in the French army, become French citizens and 
enjoy full rights and liberties within the French state. Many Alsatians and Lorrainers therefore 
perceived France as a attractive alternative to an increasingly repressive German military re-
gime.11 What hung in the balance for Imperial Germany, therefore, was not just the survival of  
the monarchy or social peace, but the territorial integrity of  the country. Ensuring the loyalty 
and patriotism of  the inhabitants of  this borderland became a veritable stress test for German 
nationalism and the bond it was able to create between the state and the people.
It was a challenge the German state ultimately proved unable to meet. By the end 
of  1914, the military authorities realized they were failing to generate broad patriotic 
support for the war. For the majority of  the local population, all they were able to 
achieve was superficial compliance, while the legitimacy of  German rule eroded.12 As 
the military focussed on suppressing ‘anti-German behaviour’, it charged the political 
and social frictions that gripped the rest of  the country with nationalist meaning. From 
August and September 1918, as will be outlined in section three below, large parts of  
the local population began openly challenging German rule, and when French troops 
finally entered the region a few months later, they were greeted by cheering crowds.13
 10 On French war aims see P. Renouvin, ‘Les buts de guerre du gouvernement français, 1914–1918’, Revue Historique, 
235 (1966), pp. 1–38; G.-H. Soutou, ‘La France et les Marches de l’Est, 1914–1919’, Revue Historique, 260 (1978), 
pp. 341–88; D. Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany, 1914–1919 (Oxford, 1982); G.-H. Soutou, L’or et le 
sang: Les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre mondiale (Paris, 1989), pp. 170–89; M. Heffernan, 
‘History, Geography and the French National Space: The Question of Alsace-Lorraine, 1914–18’, Space & Polity, 5, 
1 (2001), pp. 27–48.
 11 On French wartime policy towards Alsatians and Lorrainers see P. Smith, ‘The Kiss of France: The Republic and the 
Alsatians during the First World War’, in P. Panayi (ed.), Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in 
Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1993), pp. 27–49; J.-C. Farcy, Les camps 
de concentration français de la première guerre mondiale (1914–1920) (Paris, 1995), pp. 51–62; C. J. Fischer, ‘Of 
Occupied Territories and Lost Provinces: German and Entente Propaganda in the West during World War I’, in 
T. Paddock (ed.), A Call to Arms: Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Newspapers in the Great War (Westport, CT, 
2004), pp. 199–221; J.-N. Grandhomme, ‘Réfugiés en Vaucluse’, in J.-N. Grandhomme (ed.), Boches ou tricolores: 
Les Alsaciens-Lorrains dans la Grande Guerre (Strasbourg, 2008), pp. 163–78.
 12 See the report by Johann von Dallwitz, the emperor’s representative (Statthalter) for Alsace-Lorraine, on general 
developments in Alsace-Lorraine from August 1914 to the end of 1915, Bundesarchiv Berlin, Alte Reichskanzlei 
(henceforth BArch), R43, 168a, 4 Feb. 1916.
 13 Although there were important regional differences and much of the enthusiasm was an expression of relief 
that the war had ended, most scholars agree that large parts of the population sincerely welcomed the arrival 
of French troops. See J. Rossé, M. Stürmel, A. Bleicher, F. Deiber, and J. Keppi, Das Elsass von 1870–1932, vol. 
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Scholars have explained the resentment that German policy caused in wartime Alsace-
Lorraine by referring to the repressive military regime, the Francophile tendencies of  the 
local population and the failure of  German ‘statecraft’ (Staatskunst), with military hard-
liners blocking more liberal policy options.14 These are certainly important factors. They 
do not, however, explain exactly why and how German rule became discredited. Military 
repression and the hardships of  war affected other parts of  Germany and other war-
ring states too, causing social unrest and strikes but rarely national opposition. Overtly 
Francophile political movements, in turn, had become a small minority by 1914, and 
most people had accommodated to German rule.15 And it is doubtful whether mere tac-
tical support of  an autonomous Alsace-Lorraine by the German government would have 
imbued German rule with new legitimacy.16 As will be discussed below, moderation of  
repressive measures from December 1916 and a more lenient policy in the final months 
of  the war only had the effect of  weakening German control over the region.
This article uses hitherto unused archival evidence to re-examine the erosion of  the 
legitimacy of  German rule in Alsace-Lorraine during the First World War. It argues 
that protective custody played a crucial role in transforming the relationship between 
rulers and ruled into one of  mutual fear and distrust. Military authorities expected 
unconditional and unambiguous national devotion to the German war effort without 
offering much in return, such as full constitutional equality for the region after the war. 
Quite the contrary, with press censorship and the de facto closure of  the regional par-
liament (the Landtag), the German government suppressed any discussion of  the future 
political status of  the region, while policymakers were busy making secret plans for 
partitioning the provinces or at least extending martial law for several years past the end 
of  the war.17 Many military commanders stationed in the borderland were afraid of  an 
(Strasbourg, 1972), pp. 141–3; Wahl and Richez, L’Alsace entre France et Allemagne, pp. 251–2; Fischer, Alsace 
to the Alsatians?, p. 121.
 14 See Part II, ‘1914–1918’ in Rossé et al., Das Elsass; C. Baechler, ‘L’Alsace entre la guerre et la paix: Recherches sur 
l’opinion publique (1917–1918)’, (PhD Thesis, Strasbourg University, 1969), pp. 65, 437; S. Fisch, ‘Das Elsass im 
deutschen Kaiserreich (1870/71–1918)’, in M. Erbe (ed.), Das Elsass: historische Landschaft im Wandel der Zeiten 
(Stuttgart, 2002), pp. 123–46; A. Kramer, ‘Wackes at War: Alsace-Lorraine and the Failure of German National 
Mobilization, 1914–1918’, in J. Horne (ed.), State, Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War 
(Cambridge, 2002), pp. 105–21. On German policy in Alsace-Lorraine as a failure of ‘statecraft’, see G. Ritter, The 
Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, vol. 4: The Reign of German Militarism and the 
Disaster of 1918, trans. H. Norden (Coral Gables, 1973; first published in German in 1968 as Staatskunst und 
Kriegshandwerk: das Problem des ‘Militarismus’ in Deutschland, vol. 4: Die Herrschaft des deutschen Militarismus 
und die Katastrophe von 1918), pp. 129–44.
 15 This decline in overt opposition to German rule is indicated by national election results before the war, where German 
national parties became well-established from the 1890s. See H. J. Hiery, Reichstagswahlen im Reichsland: ein Beitrag 
zur Landesgeschichte von Elsaß-Lothringen und zur Wahlgeschichte des Deutschen Reiches, 1871–1918 (Düsseldorf, 
1986). On the successes of German policies in Alsace-Lorraine see also D. A. Harvey, Constructing Class and Nationality 
in Alsace, 1830–1945 (Dekalb, 2001), p.  87; S.  C. Preibusch, Verfassungsentwicklungen im Reichsland Elsass-
Lothringen 1871–1918: Integration durch Verfassungsrecht? (Berlin, 2006), p. 602; J.-N. Grandhomme, ‘Introduction: 
Les Alsaciens-Lorrains dans la Première Guerre Mondiale’, in Grandhomme, Boches ou tricolores, pp. 19–33, here p. 21; 
Roth, Alsace Lorraine, p. 114.
 16 Cf. Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, p. 138, who argues that such support of autonomy constituted a ‘real pol-
itical opportunity for Germany’.
 17 During the war, the Landtag held annual sessions on technical and administrative matters, while political dis-
cussions were prohibited. See Preibusch, Verfassungsentwicklungen, pp. 569–78. On censorship see Baechler, 
‘L’Alsace entre la guerre et la paix’, pp. 99–119; F. Roth, Le temps des journaux: Presse et cultures nationales en 
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allegedly treacherous population and considered themselves in ‘enemy territory’.18 In 
their eyes, protective custody was an indispensable tool to create military and national 
security. Local inhabitants, in turn, feared arbitrary arrest and expulsion and lamented 
the increasing legal insecurity and suppression of  their civil liberties. While some came 
to publicly display French symbols, insulted the kaiser or sang the Marseillaise to ex-
press their discontent, others opportunistically denounced allegedly Francophile neigh-
bours to the police to settle personal scores and present themselves as patriotic citizens. 
In all of  these cases, the actions of  the population revolved around doubts about na-
tional loyalty, confirming and further fuelling the fears of  the military authorities. The 
resulting dynamic of  mutual fear and distrust between the rulers and the population 
drove a wedge between them, eroded the authority and legitimacy of  the state and 
worked to discredit German rule months before the fighting on the Western Front had 
come to an end.19
Given the importance of  protective custody for German political and legal culture 
from the 1848 revolution right up to the Nazi era—with important ramifications in the 
German government’s response to the threat of  terrorism in the late 1970s and again in 
the wake of  the ‘war on terror’ in the early 2000s—the dearth of  studies of  the phenom-
enon is surprising.20 The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben is one of  the few who 
has drawn attention to the long tradition of  protective custody in German history and 
its connection to a state of  exception declared by the government to suppress personal 
liberties and circumvent the rule of  law.21 With regard to the First World War, histor-
ians have only very recently begun to examine protective custody more closely. Focusing 
 18 See e.g. P. Husser, Un instituteur alsacien: Entre France et Allemagne: Journal de 1914–1951, trans. L. Leininger 
(Paris, 1989), pp. 40–1, diary entry of 31 Aug. 1914. Husser was a teacher from Mulhouse, who, like many others, 
was at first supportive of the German war effort, then expressed surprise at the treatment of Alsace as ‘enemy 
territory’ and finally came to reject German rule.
 19 In a recent article on Upper Silesia after the First World War, Brendan Karch has identified a similar ‘feedback loop’, 
in this case between ‘nationalist activists and instrumentally minded Upper Silesians’ who ‘drove each other to-
ward further retrenchment’: see B. Karch, ‘Instrumental Nationalism in Upper Silesia’, in M. van Ginderachter and 
J. Fox (eds), National Indifference and the History of Nationalism in Modern Europe (London, 2019), pp. 180–203, 
here pp. 182–3.
 20 Most authors have focussed on protective custody in the Nazi era, but even here, there are few book-length 
studies. See the unpublished dissertation by D.  Scheffler, ‘Schutzhaft im Nationalsozialismus (1933 bis 1945): 
die Bürokratie des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes und die Verfolgung des politischen Gegners’ (PhD Thesis, Free 
University Berlin, 1998) and recently the volume edited by J. Wisskirchen, Verlorene Freiheit: nationalsozialistische 
Schutzhaft 1933/34 im heutigen Rhein-Erft-Kreis (Berlin, 2019). Among the few more general works are 
C.  Schudnagies, Der Kriegs- oder Belagerungszustand im Deutschen Reich während des Ersten Weltkrieges: 
eine Studie zur Entwicklung und Handhabung des deutschen Ausnahmezustandsrechts bis 1918 (Frankfurt/
Main, 1994)  and E.  R. Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, vol. 5: Weltkrieg, Revolution und 
Reichserneuerung 1914–1919 (2nd edn, Stuttgart, 1992), pp.  53–4. Several studies briefly address the rever-
berations of and discussions surrounding protective custody in the context of terrorism in the late 1970s and 
the early 2000s. On the former period see U. Berlit and H. Dreier, ‘Die legislative Auseinandersetzung mit dem 
Terrorismus’, in F. Sack and H. Steinert (eds), Protest und Reaktion (Opladen, 1984), pp. 227–318, here pp. 295–
99; H. Vinke and G. Witt, Die Anti-Terror-Debatten im Parlament: Protokolle 1974–1978 (Reinbek, 1978); W. S. 
Heinz, ‘Germany: State Responses to Terrorist Challenges and Human Rights’, in A. Brysk and G. Shafir (eds), 
National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism (Berkeley, 2007), pp. 157–76, here 
pp. 161–7; on the latter period see Heinz, ‘Germany’, pp. 167–74.
 21 See G. Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics (Minneapolis, 2000), pp. 37–8. It is important to note that 
the Nazi regime used protective custody without ever declaring a state of exception, leading Agamben to argue 
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on Prussia and Bavaria, Matthew Stibbe and André Keil argue that police and mili-
tary authorities used protective custody or similar forms of  detention not only to sup-
press political enemies but also for the ‘moral policing’ of  German society—arresting 
homeless persons, prostitutes, homosexuals, Sinti and Roma and other allegedly ‘shady 
characters’ of  the ‘urban scum’ (Großstadtgesindel).22 In the case of  Alsace-Lorraine, his-
torians commonly mention protective custody in passing as a crucial feature of  the 
repressive German wartime regime, but have thus far not studied the issue in a more 
systematic fashion.23
This article seeks to fill this gap by examining the purpose, scope and effects of  pro-
tective custody in Alsace-Lorraine. The first section provides a brief  historical back-
ground to German rule in the region and highlights the growing tensions between 
military authorities and civilian administrators immediately preceding the war. The 
second section demonstrates how protective custody, although limited in terms of  the 
overall number of  prisoners, created a pervading sense of  legal insecurity in the popu-
lation and gave rise to a perception of  arbitrary military rule. In the final, third section, 
the article examines the mounting opposition to protective custody in the German 
Reichstag, culminating in the Law on Protective Custody of  4 December 1916. As 
will be seen, this law significantly reduced the number of  detainees and new arrests in 
Alsace-Lorraine. Yet instead of  restoring the legitimacy of  German rule, half-hearted 
attempts at moderating repressive measures and the loosening of  military control back-
fired—they only encouraged the increasingly open expression of  popular discontent 
with German rule.
I. Controlling the Borderland
During the forty-seven years that the German Empire held Alsace-Lorraine, it pursued 
two ostensibly contradictory aims: to assert tight Imperial control over the newly ac-
quired territories, on the one hand, and to make them an integral and equal part of  
the nation, on the other. Consequently, German policy oscillated between repressing 
dissent and granting citizens more rights. From 1871 to the Boulanger crisis in the late 
1880s, when protest against German rule was strongest, local authorities predominantly 
sought to quell opposition. Notably, they applied §10 of  the Law on the Administration 
of  Alsace-Lorraine—the so-called Diktaturparagraph—to expel troublesome French citi-
zens.24 In 1888, in an attempt to fortify the border with France and keep French citizens 
out, Bismarck introduced passport checks and required visitors to obtain a visa to enter 
the province.25 Several countervailing measures gradually reduced legal insecurity and 
 22 Keil and Stibbe, ‘Ein Laboratorium des Ausnahmezustandes’.
 23 See the short passages on protective custody in Rossé et al., Das Elsass, vol. 1, pp. 241–8; Baechler, ‘L’Alsace entre 
la guerre et la paix’, pp. 58–65; Preibusch, Verfassungsentwicklungen, p. 581; Grandhomme, ‘Introduction’, p. 25; 
Roth, Alsace Lorraine, p. 133; Fischer, Alsace to the Alsatians?, p. 109; J.-N. Grandhomme and F. Grandhomme, 
Les Alsaciens-Lorrains dans la Grande Guerre (Strasbourg, 2013), p. 257.
 24 See M. P. Fitzpatrick, Purging the Empire: Mass Expulsions in Germany, 1871–1914 (Oxford, 2015), pp. 211–12. 
For the legal text see ‘Gesetz, betreffend die Einrichtung der Verwaltung’, dated 30 Dec. 1871, Gesetzblatt für 
Elsaß-Lothringen (Berlin, 1872), pp. 49–56.
 25 See Fisch, ‘Das Elsass im deutschen Kaiserreich’, p.  131; F.  Roth, Lorraine, France, Allemagne: Un parcours 
d’historien (Metz, 2002), p. 32; G. Riederer, Feiern im Reichsland: politische Symbolik, öffentliche Festkultur und 
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moderated repressive policies: in 1879, Alsace-Lorraine received a Statthalter, a repre-
sentative appointed by the emperor, who mediated between Strasbourg and Berlin; in 
1891, passport controls on the border to France and visa requirements for civilians were 
lifted;26 in 1902, the Diktaturparagraph was abolished; and in 1911, the region obtained 
a constitution and a democratically elected parliament, the Landtag.27 Around 1900, 
German political parties began to take hold in Alsace-Lorraine, mass protest against 
German rule subsided and economic growth further bound the region to Germany.28 
By the time the war broke out, however, integration was incomplete. The provinces had 
not achieved full legal equality with the other German states, and the civilian author-
ities remained under the supreme control of  the emperor and the military.
The notorious Saverne Affair revealed how fragile the position of  the civilian admin-
istrators and elected representatives was, and how easily local military units were able to 
defy the parliaments in Strasbourg and Berlin.29 The crisis began on 28 October 1913 
in the small Alsatian town of  Zabern (French: Saverne), when a 20-year-old German 
lieutenant, Günter Freiherr von Forstner, set an award of  ten marks for every ‘Wackes’ 
his recruits would assault. ‘Wackes’ was a strongly pejorative term for Alsatians. On 6 
November, a local newspaper, the Zaberner Anzeiger, published von Forstner’s statement. 
What followed was a series of  protest marches by local youths and workers against the 
military stationed in Zabern. On 28 November, the conflict escalated. Ignoring the ad-
vice of  the civilian Statthalter Karl von Wedel and Georg Mahl, the chief  administrative 
officer (Kreisdirektor) of  the district of  Zabern, Colonel Ernst von Reuter, von Forstner’s 
regimental commander, single-handedly declared martial law and ordered his troops to 
arrest the troublemakers. According to several testimonies, the military arrested twenty-
seven persons that same night completely at random, including a number of  jurists who 
happened to be at the scene.30 Without using the term, the military authorities had ef-
fectively taken these civilians into protective custody. Anticipating developments during 
the war, von Forstner and von Reuter were backed by the emperor and the government, 
while the German parliament lamented the unlawful actions of  the military but was 
ultimately unable to challenge its dominant position in the state.
Facing rising national pressures, the Alsatians and Lorrainers began developing a 
strong regional identity that centred on their Franco-German ‘double culture’.31 In this 
way, locals hoped to stay aloof  from the nationalist claims of  Germany and France. 
Prominent writers and artists such as René Schickele and Charles Spindler but also 
politicians like the socialist Georges Weill thus sought to create bridges across national 
divides, knowing that any improvement of  relations between France and Germany 
 26 Military personnel required a visa to cross the border until 1900.
 27 See Preibusch, Verfassungsentwicklungen, pp. 496–516.
 28 On party politics and election results see Hiery, Reichstagswahlen. More specifically on the Social Democrats see 
Harvey, Constructing Class, pp. 86–92; A. Carrol, ‘Socialism and National Identity in Alsace from Reichsland to 
République, 1890–1921’, European History Quarterly, 40, 1 (2010), pp. 57–78, here pp. 60–1. On economic inte-
gration see Roth, Alsace Lorraine, pp. 49–50.
 29 On the Saverne Affair see H.-U. Wehler, Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, 1871–1918: Studien zur deutschen Sozial- 
und Verfassungsgeschichte (Göttingen, 1970), pp.  70–88; D.  Schoenbaum, Zabern 1913: Consensus Politics 
in Imperial Germany (London, 1982); Preibusch, Verfassungsentwicklungen, pp. 486–95; Fischer, Alsace to the 
Alsatians?, pp. 90–5.
 30 See Schoenbaum, Zabern 1913, p. 111.
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would directly benefit Alsace-Lorraine.32 While this regionalist approach provided a 
difficult but nevertheless promising ‘third way’ in peacetime, it raised suspicion and fear 
of  sabotage among military authorities the moment the war broke out.
II. Protective Custody and the Enemy Within
From the first days of  the war, the military authorities began making arrests of  al-
legedly dangerous Francophile civilians. Using black lists, they initially focused on 
well-known journalists, politicians and the clergy, but soon began to target all persons 
who were reported to display some form of  ‘suspicious’ behaviour.33 Protective custody 
often followed unverified denunciations or accidental observations by police or military 
personnel.34 In a debate in the German parliament in June 1918, Lorrainian deputy 
Charles de Wendel recounted a striking incident of  such an arbitrary arrest. In the first 
days of  August 1914, a local priest from Amanweiler (French: Amanvillers) near Metz 
was on his way home from a neighbouring village when he encountered a Bavarian 
infantry colonel. The colonel asked the priest who he was, where he came from and 
where he was going. Later that same day, to everyone’s surprise, the colonel had the 
priest arrested, on the grounds that because the priest had stammered in his reply, he 
‘was up to no good’. It was well-known in the village, de Wendel remarked, that the 
priest had a speech impediment. Placed in protective custody, the priest was released 
only three months later.35
Protective custody interfered with and superseded wartime justice, most notably the 
work of  the eight extraordinary military courts (außerordentliche Kriegsgerichte) that had 
been installed across the territory of  Alsace-Lorraine at the beginning of  the war.36 
These courts were supposed to hear all cases where civilians were accused of  breaching 
military decrees, including, for instance, speaking French in public, spreading mili-
tary rumours, crossing county borders without a permit and any form of  offensive 
anti-German behaviour. The files of  the military administration show that the Army 
High Command (Armee-Oberkommando) of  the Army Detachments (Armee-Abteilungen) 
A and B, which were stationed in Alsace-Lorraine, frequently imposed protective cus-
tody on people who had been acquitted by one of  the extraordinary military courts or, 
in case of  conviction and imprisonment, after they had served their sentences. While 
the archival record does not allow for a quantitative analysis, it strongly suggests that 
the majority of  people who appeared before the extraordinary military courts were 
 32 On Schickele see D.  Lamping, Über Grenzen: eine literarische Topographie (Göttingen, 2001), pp.  37–52; on 
Spindler see J.-M. Gyss, ‘Charles Spindler, écrivain et mémorialiste’, in C. Spindler, L’Alsace pendant la guerre: 
1914–1918 (Nancy, 2008), pp. 9–25; and on Weill see Carrol, ‘Socialism’, pp. 61–3.
 33 According to State Secretary for Alsace-Lorraine Georg von Tschammer, these black lists contained the names of 
160 persons. See Archives départementales du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg (henceforth ADBR), 22 AL 131, minutes of 
the Bingen conference, 16 June 1917.
 34 Even Statthalter Dallwitz admitted that denunciations had become a major ‘problem’ in Alsace-Lorraine, because 
many of them lacked proof or concerned banalities but nevertheless frequently led directly to protective custody. 
See ibid., 15 June 1917.
 35 See the minutes of the 169th session of the German Reichstag, 7 June 1918, in Verhandlungen des Reichstags: 
XIII. Legislaturperiode, II. Session, vol. 312 (Berlin, 1918), p. 5266.
 36 On the extraordinary military courts see Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 5, pp. 45–6; Schudnagies, 
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subsequently taken into protective custody and expelled. The military court councillor 
(Kriegsgerichtsrat) of  Army Detachment B (also known as Army Detachment Gaede, for 
its commander, Hans Gaede), Heinrich Dietz, mentioned in his diary that trials had sig-
nificantly augmented the number of  arrests, because following a trial, the extraordinary 
military courts typically confirmed with the Army High Command whether further 
measures were to be taken:
Right from the beginning of  the war, numerous politically suspicious persons were taken into protective 
custody. Owing to the large number of  legal investigations, these cases have proliferated widely. Even where 
acquittal owing to lack of  evidence had been pronounced, protective custody was always considered.37
A memorandum by Gaede specified that in cases of  anti-German behaviour, defend-
ants were ‘generally (even after they had served their sentence) taken into protective 
custody or at least removed from the theatre of  operations [Operationsgebiet]’.38 Until 
the autumn of  1917, when many detainees and expellees were permitted to return, 
protective custody was usually followed by expulsion to a different region within Alsace-
Lorraine or to the German interior.39
Owing to the sketchy archival record and the disjointed state of  the military ad-
ministration, it is difficult to assess the total number of  people who were affected by 
protective custody, expulsion and trials. According to statistics communicated in the 
Landtag of  Alsace-Lorraine in April 1918, by this date 1,640 civilians had been placed 
in protective custody and 1,900 had been expelled.40 Further archival evidence by and 
large confirms these figures: the minutes of  the Bingen conference of  June 1917, where 
representatives of  the military and the German government discussed wartime pol-
icies in Alsace-Lorraine, refer to 1,444 cases of  protective custody by 1 June 1917;41 
a list of  all expelled civilians from Lower Alsace states their number at 768;42 and a 
similar list for Upper Alsace, although confined to 1915–1916, contains the names 
of  698 expellees.43 After the war, the Ligue des proscrits d’Alsace (League of  the Outcasts 
of  Alsace) accepted 4,820 of  roughly 6,000 membership requests from victims of  ar-
rest or expulsion during the war.44 With regard to trials, the departmental archives in 
Strasbourg hold a complete list of  all wartime trials for anti-German behaviour heard 
 37 GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F3 118, war diary of Heinrich Dietz, military court councillor of the Army Detachment Gaede, 
from 21 Nov. 1914 to 15 Mar. 1915, p. 10.
 38 GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F3 97, memorandum by Hans Gaede, 27 Apr. 1915. See also the records of individual cases 
in GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F3 126, 152; 456 F9 143, 192, 406; and in Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (henceforth HSA 
Stuttgart), M30/1 Bü 309.
 39 The Army High Command sought to accommodate preferences of the expellees in terms of their destination, 
although the authorities were also wary not to create ‘a large colony of unreliable Alsace-Lorrainian elements’ in 
the German interior, as was apparently emerging in Baden-Baden towards the end of the war. See Deputy General 
Commander XIV Army Corps to Deputy General Commander XXI Army Corps, 6 Feb. 1918, GLA Karlsruhe, 456 
F3 135.
 40 See the minutes of the 169th session of the German Reichstag, 7 June 1918, in Verhandlungen des Reichstages, 
vol. 312, p. 5283. According to these figures, in 1,110 of the 1,640 cases of protective custody, arrest was based 
on political grounds.
 41 ADBR, 22 AL 131, ‘Übersicht A, über die seit Kriegsausbruch bis 1.6.1917 in Schutzhaft genommenen Personen 
(soweit nach den Akten feststellbar)’, annex to the minutes of the Bingen conference of 15–16 June 1917.
 42 ADBR, 116 AL 12, ‘Namentliches Verzeichnis der Ausgewiesenen, 1914–1918’, undated.
 43 GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F3 458, ‘Liste B der aus dem Operationsgebiet entfernten Personen, 1915–1916’, undated.
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by the extraordinary military courts in Alsace-Lorraine. The list contains the names of  
2,249 persons, including those who were acquitted.45 Roughly a third (35.4 per cent) of  
all cases concerned women.46
The fluctuations in these numbers result not only from different methods of  data 
collection, but also from the fact that there was substantial overlap between trials, pro-
tective custody and expulsion. The same person could be tried at one of  the extra-
ordinary military courts, placed in protective custody and expelled to the German 
interior. In other cases, civilians were merely placed in protective custody and then re-
leased, or they were directly expelled to the German interior without trial or protective 
custody. The archival record does not reveal with any precision the extent to which 
trials, protective custody and expulsions coincided. Considering the different figures 
discussed above, one can estimate that at least 3,000 civilians were affected by at least 
one of  these measures of  the military authorities.
A list created by Alfred Weill in 1921 based on various sources provides more 
fine-grained insights into protective custody, regional disparities and gender differences. 
The list includes the names of  1,455 Alsatians and Lorrainers who had been subjected 
to arrest, expulsion and/or police surveillance.47 It indicates substantial overlap be-
tween these categories: 63.4 per cent of  all persons on the list had been imprisoned 
or placed in protective custody (with an average sentence of  181 days), while 80.4 per 
cent had been expelled (for an average of  620 days) and 33.8 per cent had been placed 
under police surveillance (for an average of  613  days). Every one of  those persons 
who had been imprisoned faced either expulsion (69.7 per cent) or police surveillance 
(14.1 per cent) or both (16.2 per cent). The list also reveals significant regional diver-
sity. Upper Alsace, a region with a strong Francophile bourgeoisie that directly faced 
the Western Front, was disproportionately affected, with 46.8 per cent of  all persons 
listed while representing only 27.6 per cent of  the total population.48 Lower Alsace 
(19.4 / 37.4 per cent) and Lorraine (31.2 / 35 per cent) were proportionately less af-
fected (2.3 per cent were missing or outside Alsace-Lorraine). At the same time, the list 
also suggests that residents of  Lower Alsace—although the region saw comparatively 
few cases—received the most severe penalties, with 73.1 per cent of  prison sentences 
with an average of  196 days in prison, as compared to Upper Alsace (64.9 per cent 
and 176 days) and Lorraine (54.6 per cent and 172 days). Finally, there were also stark 
gender differences: while 25.3 per cent of  all persons on the list were women, the pro-
portion of  women was highest in Upper Alsace, with 32.7 per cent, as opposed to 21.6 
per cent for Lower Alsace and 16.1 per cent for Lorraine. On average, women received 
 45 The list is in ADBR, 87 AL 5735.
 46 On the work of the extraordinary military courts see V.  Prott, ‘Challenging the German Empire: Strategic 
Nationalism in Alsace-Lorraine in the First World War’, Nations and Nationalism (pre-print, 2021), https://doi.
org/10.1111/nana.12665.
 47 The following are my own calculations based on J.  Weill, L’Alsace et les Alsaciens pendant la guerre, vol. 1: 
Schutzhaft et expulsion politique d’après des documents et des dossiers inédits (Strasbourg, 1921), pp. 159–203. 
Weill’s list contains many names that also appear in the records of the German military authorities (including Paul 
Tempé) and appears to be incomplete but otherwise reliable.
 48 According to the 1910 census, Alsace-Lorraine had a total population of 1,874,014, of whom 700,938 (37.4%) 
were in Lower Alsace, 517,865 (27.6%) in Upper Alsace and 655,211 (35%) in Lorraine. See J. Rossé et al., Das 
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lighter penalties than men, with 54.9 per cent of  all women receiving prison sentences 
(average of  167 days) while 66.3 per cent of  the men were sentenced to imprisonment 
(average of  185 days). This pattern persists if  the data is broken down for each region, 
that is, women received lighter sentences than men across all three regions.
Protective custody and expulsions had a devastating effect on the reputation of  the 
German authorities as purveyors of  justice. The seemingly arbitrary character of  these 
measures—not wartime justice per se—eroded people’s sense of  legal security and in-
stilled an atmosphere of  nationalist resentment among the population. As Christian 
Baechler argued in his well-documented dissertation on public opinion in wartime 
Alsace-Lorraine, censorship, the suspension of  civil liberties and the lack of  reliable 
information on the course of  the war prompted many people to rely on, and to spread 
themselves, rumours and information passed by word-of-mouth. In this tense setting, 
arrests, trials, expulsions, denunciations and police investigations occurred frequently 
enough to create a strong public perception of  a ubiquitous threat of  falling prey to 
an unpredictable military regime. It is no coincidence that virtually all contemporaries 
noted the atmosphere of  distrust and suspicion that pervaded the region from early 
September 1914. Auguste Zundel, for instance, a businessman from Mulhouse, men-
tioned in his diary that he and a colleague quit their public duties at the town hall upon 
hearing of  ongoing arrests and expulsions affecting friends and acquaintances: ‘We do 
not want to stay on in our posts if  the government regards us as suspects.’49 The diaries 
of  other contemporaries and secret reports of  Statthalter Dallwitz corroborate this 
impression of  growing suspicion and distrust.50 Huber’s assessment that protective cus-
tody was ‘free of  excesses’ may be accurate in terms of  absolute numbers, but it misses 
its significant impact on people’s perception of  German rule as not just repressive but 
also arbitrary.51
The military administration was well aware of  these shortcomings. As an internal 
army memorandum of  March 1915 admitted, most victims of  protective custody stated 
in the interrogation records that they did not know the reasons for their arrest.52 The 
case of  Paul Tempé mentioned at the beginning of  this article is typical of  the chronic 
neglect of  detainees. Writing from his prison cell in Colmar following his second arrest, 
Tempé complained to Joseph, a friend or relative in Switzerland, about the circum-
stances of  his two arrests:
I had just arrived in the capital [Berlin] when I was arrested without anyone telling 
me why. … Emaciated, I arrived in Colmar on 9 January [1916]. My body weight had 
dropped to 122 pounds. I had been imprisoned for 19 days, without light during those 
long nights and without having drunk a single drop of  beer or wine. I had hardly re-
covered when, on the eighth of  this month [February 1916], I was again taken into 
 49 See A. Zundel, 1914–1918: Journal de la Grande Guerre vécue à Mulhouse (Colmar, 2004), p. 100, diary entry of 
5 Sept. 1915.
 50 See Spindler, L’Alsace pendant la guerre, pp.  68, 86, diary entries of 19 Aug. and 4 Sept. 1914; Husser, Un 
instituteur alsacien, p. 45, diary entry of 14 Sept. 1914; M.-F. Zingerlé, Toujours fidèle à la France! Journal de 
guerre 1914–18 d’une paysanne lorraine (Sarreguemines, 2003), p. 26; diary entry of 21 Aug. 1916 (reflecting on 
the first weeks of the war); BArch, R43, 168a, Dallwitz, ‘Report on Alsace-Lorraine in the third quarter of 1914 
until the end of 1915’, 4 Feb. 1916.
 51 Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, vol. 5, p. 53.
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protective custody, and again I do not know why. Fortunately, I am now allowed to ob-
tain my food from home and the conditions of  imprisonment are by far not as severe as 
in the city on the River Spree.53
Indeed, circumstances of  arrest and detention varied hugely between administrative 
units. Until at least June 1915, local police and military authorities carried out arrests 
independently of  the Army High Command.54 Lack of  qualified personnel and poor 
co-ordination between police, military judges and officers meant that many detainees 
were interrogated several times by different people, while others were held for days or 
even weeks without interrogation if  there was no qualified policeman, military officer or 
judge available.55 In one extreme instance, a detainee had to wait for more than seven 
months for his trial, not only because the examination of  witnesses had been delayed, 
but also because ‘seven higher military courts had been dealing with the matter’.56
Protective custody was emblematic of  the haphazard implementation and indeed the 
limits of  military rule, which undermined the effectiveness of  the regime’s measures and 
further exacerbated perceptions of  arbitrariness and legal insecurity. After the outbreak of  
war, Alsace-Lorraine had been placed under the authority of  Army Detachments A (also 
named ‘Falkenhausen’, for its commander Ludwig von Falkenhausen) in the north and 
B (Gaede) in the south. These two larger units were divided into several smaller military 
districts and so-called fortress zones (Festungsbereiche), the commanders of  which issued de-
crees, carried out police investigations and ordered arrests and expulsions independently 
of  each other. They thus created a patchwork of  decrees rather than a coherent system of  
repression.57 As early as in October 1914, the Department of  the Interior in Strasbourg 
warned the general command of  the four army corps stationed in Alsace-Lorraine that 
a significant number of  decrees infringed upon normal administrative practice. Thus ex-
ceeding their already considerable authority, military commanders further diminished the 
‘feeling of  legal security among the population’.58 Moreover, in addition to the shortage of  
qualified personnel and lack of  administrative consistency, civil society acted as a powerful 
barrier to the dictatorial pretensions of  the military commanders. To the latter’s ongoing 
frustration, a significant number of  local mayors, judges, priests, police officers, teachers 
and others successfully worked to attenuate or diffuse the effects of  their decrees.59
III. Limiting Protective Custody, Unleashing Mass Disaffection
In view of  the alarming activities of  police and military authorities across the entire 
territory of  the German Reich, which had the potential to undermine the rule of  law 
 53 GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F9 390, Paul Tempé to Joseph (no last name given), 23 Feb. 1916. The letter was intercepted 
by postal control.
 54 From June 1915, the Army High Command ordered local authorities to confirm any potential case of protective 
custody with them. See ADBR, 116 AL 11, directive issued by the Army Detachment Falkenhausen, Army High 
Command, Strasbourg, 17 June 1915.
 55 GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F3 97, memorandum by Fürst zu Löwenstein, 27 Mar. 1915.
 56 GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F3 97, memorandum by the commander of the XIV Army Corps, Hans Gaede, 27 July 1915.
 57 See GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F3 89, memorandum by Wilhelm Heye, chief of the operations department at the Army 
Group Duke Albrecht, 16 Dec. 1917.
 58 ADBR, 22 AL 51, Department of the Interior (Strasbourg) to the army corps in Strasbourg, Freiburg and 
Saarbrucken, Oct. 1914.
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and erase the remainders of  civic institutions, opposition to protective custody mounted 
in the Reichstag. The issue was first raised by the Social Democrats Richard Fischer (27 
August 1915), Wilhelm Dittmann (18 January 1916) and Georg Davidsohn (17 April 
1916).60 Dittmann accused the German government of  ‘trampling upon the law and 
the constitution’, which earned him a reprimand from the parliament’s vice-president, 
Heinrich Dove.61 The debate gained momentum in late May 1916, when the Social 
Democrats were joined in their criticism by Alsatian deputy Joseph Emmel from 
Mulhouse. Emmel was the first member of  the Reichstag to highlight the political 
ramifications of  protective custody in Alsace-Lorraine: ‘You cannot “Germanize” the 
Reichsland (imperial country or reich country) with such measures’, he warned the gov-
ernment, ‘at least you need to provide the people with the necessary rights and the 
opportunity to defend themselves.’62
The growing criticism of  protective custody in the Reichstag resulted in the Law on 
Protective Custody of  4 December 1916.63 The new law provided detainees with the 
right to appeal and to consult a lawyer, required military authorities to inform arrested 
persons about the accusations raised against them upon arrest or immediately there-
after and imposed a limit of  three months of  detention, after which the arrest warrant 
was to be renewed or the detainee released. Victims of  protective custody were hence-
forth able to claim compensation for unjustified detention through the supreme military 
court (Reichsmilitärgericht).
Although there were difficulties in putting these regulations fully into practice, the 
new law allowed the German parliament to exert significant pressure on the military 
authorities. At least in Alsace-Lorraine, the parliament was able to put limits on the 
policy of  protective custody and expulsion.64 As the records of  the military adminis-
tration indicate, from the autumn of  1917, large numbers of  expellees were permitted 
to return to their homes, while protective custody was upheld in a comparatively small 
number of  cases.65 According to the minutes of  the Bingen conference of  June 1917, by 
this time, of  1,444 Alsatians and Lorrainers placed in protective custody since the out-
break of  the war, 472 remained in protective custody, 471 had been expelled and 501 
 60 See the minutes of the 20th, 32nd and 41st sessions of the German Reichstag, 27 Aug. 1915, 18 Jan. 1916 and 7 
Apr. 1916, in Verhandlungen des Reichstags: XIII. Legislaturperiode, II. Session (Berlin, 1916), vol. 306, pp. 397–8, 
716–25, and vol. 307, p. 906.
 61 Minutes of the 32nd session of the German Reichstag, 18 Jan. 1916, in Verhandlungen des Reichstags, vol. 306, 
p. 716.
 62 Minutes of the 53rd session of the German Reichstag, 14 May 1916, in Verhandlungen des Reichstags, vol. 307, 
p. 1243.
 63 See ‘Gesetz, betreffend die Verhaftung und Aufenthaltsbeschränkung auf Grund des Kriegszustandes und des 
Belagerungszustandes vom 4.  Dezember 1916’, Reichs-Gesetzblatt (Berlin, 1916), pp.  1329–31, available on-
line at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deutsches_Reichsgesetzblatt_1916_275_1329.png. In return, on 
6 December 1916, the Reichstag agreed to approve the Auxiliary Services Act (Gesetz über den vaterländischen 
Hilfsdienst), pushing the German economy towards total war.
 64 Cf. Keil and Stibbe, ‘Ein Laboratorium des Ausnahmezustandes’, who observe increasing numbers of protective 
custodies or similar forms of detentions in Prussia and Bavaria and conclude that the law of 4 December 1916 had 
little tangible effect on the practice of protective custody in these regions.
 65 See GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F3 137, ‘Namentliches Verzeichnis der in das Gebiet der Armee-Abteilung 
Zurückgelassenen’, without date (after Feb. 1918). This list contains the names of 443 expellees who had been 
permitted to return home between December 1916 and February 1918, with the majority of releases occurring in 
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had been released and returned to their homes.66 By April 1918, a total 700 of  1,900 
expellees had returned to their homes, and only 67 of  1,640 persons remained in pro-
tective custody.67 Between January 1917 and August 1918, about a quarter of  130 ap-
peals against wrongful imposition of  protective custody and expulsion were successful 
at the supreme military court, leading to the release of  the claimants in 30 cases (23.3 
per cent) and to an additional payment of  compensation in 24 cases (18.5 per cent).68 
In Paul Tempé’s case, the supreme military court rejected both his appeal and his claim 
for compensation as ‘unfounded’, reiterating the earlier charges of  his ‘Francophile 
utterances’ in Berlin in December 1915 and his unauthorized contact with French pris-
oners of  war in Schwerte in June 1917.69
In contrast to the rest of  Germany, where the law of  4 December 1916 had little 
tangible effect, in Alsace-Lorraine it significantly reduced the number of  detainees and 
new arrests in the second half  of  the war. The regularization of  protective custody 
in the Reichsland marked a gradual return to the prewar political system, wherein the 
executive power of  the government and the military was checked by what Matthew 
Fitzpatrick has identified as ‘intense and often effective forms of  political scrutiny and 
civic pressure’.70 Testifying to the growing leverage of  civilian forces, in February 1917 
State Secretary of  the Interior Karl Helfferich, in line with the Prussian War Ministry, 
vetoed a proposal by General Ludendorff, by this point a dominant force in the German 
state, that the relatives of  deserters from Alsace-Lorraine be taken into protective cus-
tody. Helfferich and the war ministry were notably afraid that the matter might cause 
an uproar in the Reichstag.71 Placing military commanders and police under legal and 
political scrutiny was part of  a wider ‘cross-party campaign for the liberalisation or re-
form of  the Reich constitution in the years 1917–18’, as outlined by Matthew Stibbe.72
Even so, the parliament’s successes in bringing protective custody under legal con-
trol and taming the government’s policy in the final year of  the war had little positive 
effect on the loyalty of  the local inhabitants to Germany. Quite the contrary, in leaving 
the political rationale of  national suspicion and the claim on the borderland’s uncon-
ditional loyalty intact while loosening the administrative strings, moderation of  repres-
sion simply caused discontent with and disaffection from German rule to gain mass 
public traction.73 Notably, the continued policy of  ‘Germanization’ in other areas—by 
 66 ADBR, 22 AL 131, ‘Übersicht A, über die seit Kriegsausbruch bis 1.6.1917 in Schutzhaft genommenen Personen 
(soweit nach den Akten feststellbar)’, annex to the minutes of the Bingen conference of 15–16 June 1917.
 67 See the minutes of the 169th session of the German Reichstag, 7 June 1918, in Verhandlungen des Reichstages, 
vol. 312, p. 5283.
 68 HSA Stuttgart, M 30/1 Bü 115, rulings of the supreme military court on cases of protective custody and expulsion 
of Alsatians and Lorrainers, Jan. 1917 – Aug. 1918. Of 130 cases heard, the court accepted 30 claims (23.3%), 
partially accepted a further 4 (3.1%), rejected 72 (55.8%) and declared inadmissible 23 (17.8%).
 69 GLA Karlsruhe, 456 F9 390, ruling of the supreme military court in the case of Paul Tempé, 8 Feb. 1919.
 70 M. P.  Fitzpatrick, ‘A State of Exception? Mass Expulsions and the German Constitutional State, 1871–1914’, 
Journal of Modern History, 85, 4 (2013), pp. 772–800, here p. 799.
 71 See B. Ziemann, Violence and the German Soldier in the Great War: Killing, Dying, Surviving, trans. A. Evans 
(London, 2017), p. 117. My thanks to Matthew Stibbe for alerting me to this reference.
 72 M. Stibbe, Germany, 1914–1933: Politics, Society, and Culture (New York, 2010), p. 15.
 73 As Matthew Stibbe shows, a similar mechanism of belated and half-hearted reforms causing growing internal dis-
sent occurred in Austria-Hungary, after Emperor Charles had issued amnesty for domestic political suspects in May 
1917: M. Stibbe, ‘Enemy Aliens, Deportees, Refugees: Internment Practices in the Habsburg Empire, 1914–1918’, 
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seizing French private and corporate property and by offering sequestrated houses and 
estates to Germans from the interior74—counteracted any effort to put limits on the 
use of  protective custody. In the nationally charged and polarized political climate that 
the military authorities had themselves created, many people had lost their trust not 
just in the administration and the management of  the war but also in German rule al-
together. They increasingly began to perceive France, which had thus far been a symbol 
of  protest against martial law and the military commanders, as a realistic alternative 
to German rule.
Administrative reports reflect the gradual unravelling of  German rule in Alsace-
Lorraine as many detainees and expellees returned to their homes, the authorities be-
came more lenient in their suppression of  anti-German behaviour and the Allies began 
their decisive offensive in the west. A report by the Secret Field Police (Geheime Feldpolizei) 
of  the 19th Army, stationed in Saint-Avold in Lorraine, warned that the local popu-
lation had previously spoken German, but about June 1917 had begun switching to 
French. According to the report, the main causes for this shift to French were the almost 
complete cessation of  denunciations and the fact that church services were now held 
in French, which made it seem acceptable to people to use the language in public.75 
From August 1918, reports mentioning increasing numbers of  people speaking French 
in public and displaying affinities to France multiplied. Ticket inspectors in the trams 
of  Thionville (German: Diedenhofen) in Lorraine complained that passengers would 
refuse to speak German and that any attempt to compel them to do so only attracted 
their ‘hatred’, without achieving anything.76 In late September, the secret field police 
in Thionville remarked that following the recent successes of  the French army, there 
had been several instances where locals had assaulted Germans from the interior and 
had insulted them as ‘dirty Prussians’ and ‘boches’, a derogatory term for Germans. 
Meanwhile, the report went on to say, schoolchildren and everyone else openly spoke 
French.77 Clearly, a growing number of  local authorities now tacitly accepted the public 
use of  French, which had been banned in most parts of  Alsace-Lorraine by military 
decree.78
 74 By March 1918, the Westmark GmbH had seized the property of 2,302 private citizens (931 in Lower Alsace, 495 
in Upper Alsace and 876 in Lorraine), while 215 large estates were in the process of being ‘liquidated’. Statthalter 
Dallwitz boasted that the policy of dispossession was ‘in full swing’, so that ‘the peace negotiations will be pre-
sented with a fait accompli’. See Dallwitz’s report on Alsace-Lorraine for the second half of the year 1917, dated 5 
Apr. 1918, in BArch, R43, 168a. On the radical plans to replace the bourgeoisie of Alsace-Lorraine with Germans 
from the interior see H. G. Kessler, Das Tagebuch, vol. 6: 1916–1918, ed. G. Riederer (Stuttgart, 2006), p. 394, 
diary entry of 18 May 1918. Kessler cites from a conversation with Wilhelm Kapp, an Alsatian professor of the-
ology in Strasbourg, who outlined the ‘operation’ planned in the Great Headquarters (Großes Hauptquartier) and 
the circle around Ludendorff: a ‘trust’ of sequestrated textile factories with a capital of 30 million marks would 
organize ‘artificially, from the top, a violent transformation and reconstruction of the Alsatian people’s body 
[Volkskörper] by violently implanting new economic agents [Wirtschaftsträger]’.
 75 HSA Stuttgart, M 30/1 Bü 104, report by the Secret Field Police of the 19th Army, 9 Aug. 1918.
 76 HSA Stuttgart, M 30/1 Bü 104, W. Vieten, director of Lorrainian railways, to the chief of police in Thionville, 29 
Aug. 1918.
 77 HSA Stuttgart, M 30/1 Bü 104, report by the Secret Field Police of the 19th Army, 27 Sept. 1918.
 78 See HSA Stuttgart, M 30/1 Bü 104, report by Felix von Bothmer, commander of the 19th Army, 20 Aug. 1918, 
in which he notes that after the ‘pressure’ had been reduced and police and military had stopped ‘intervening’, 
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On 6 August 1918, the chief  of  the military police in Metz noted the close relation-
ship between people’s defiance of  military decrees and regulations, the successes of  the 
Allied armies and the waning authority of  the administration, thus providing a stark 
account of  the dissolution of  German rule in Alsace-Lorraine:
Those well-acquainted with local conditions attribute this phenomenon [the increased use of  French] 
to the fact that the local population is convinced that Germany will lose the war and will be forced to 
abandon Alsace-Lorraine. It is striking that whenever news from the Front is less favourable, the number of  
people speaking French instantly increases. Those acquainted with local conditions attribute the increased 
use of  French also to the return of  many political expellees and detainees to Metz.79
IV. Conclusion
In modern German and European history, protective custody points to a long-lived 
tendency for the state and the military to try and impose national loyalty on the ci-
vilian population by force during intense periods of  conflict. This authoritarian trad-
ition dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, reached a peak in the two world wars, 
and in the German context has echoes in contemporary debates on the terrorist threats 
of  the late 1970s and the early 2000s.80 During the First World War, the state used pro-
tective custody in Alsace-Lorraine to avert what it perceived as an existential threat to 
German national and territorial cohesion. The dogma of  absolute control and national 
security prompted the military authorities to crack down on any deviant behaviour and 
dissent as dangerous signs of  anti-German subversion. That repression was an attempt 
to resolve a crisis of  political legitimacy and national solidarity by imposing national co-
herence from above, that is, by using martial law to silence the population and suppress 
civilian and democratic structures.
Rather than enforce security and national cohesion, however, this approach only 
deepened the divide between rulers and ruled. Protective custody transformed the rela-
tionship between state authorities and local citizens into one of  mutual fear and suspi-
cion. While the local population feared arbitrary arrest, military rulers felt surrounded 
by people of  dubious national affiliation who always seemed to be on the verge of  sabo-
tage or collaboration with the enemy. In their view, protective custody was an indispens-
able instrument to pre-emptively remove the threat of  subversion by ‘protecting’ the 
population from the malicious influence of  the allegedly omnipresent enemy within. 
This mutual perception of  threat and national subversion prevented constructive polit-
ical dialogue, undermined the rule of  law, focussed all attention on nationalist subver-
sion and ultimately worked to alienate the Alsatians and Lorrainers from German rule.
 79 HSA Stuttgart, M 30/1 Bü 104, report by the chief of police of Metz, 6 Aug. 1918.
 80 Parliamentary debates of the late 1970s demonstrate that although there were calls for martial law or summary 
executions of left-wing terrorists, these calls remained outside the political mainstream. Even so, the debates also 
reveal that the rule of law and the Nazi past were key reference points surrounded by much anxiety: while Social 
Democrats and Liberals feared that tighter legislation and swift police action against left-wing terrorists might lead 
to the rebirth of a past authoritarian spirit, Christian Democrats alluded to the weakness of the Weimar Republic 
in the face of extremist forces and the need for a militant democracy. See Vinke and Witt, Anti-Terror-Debatten, 
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To be precise, it was the perception of  unchecked and arbitrary military domination—
not a large number of  arrests or a tight-knit repressive regime—that worked to discredit 
German rule. In the decisive first half  of  the war, the use of  protective custody seriously 
undermined legal security in Alsace-Lorraine not only because of  the lack of  legal con-
straints but also because of  the lack of  central coordination in the military apparatus. 
Moreover, in the absence of  reliable information on the war and its conduct, many 
people began to rely on rumour and word-of-mouth. In this manner, a significant but 
nevertheless comparatively small number of  arbitrary arrests and expulsions sufficed to 
create an all-pervading atmosphere of  national suspicion and distrust. Protective cus-
tody gradually worked to erode the credibility of  the military administration and, given 
the military authorities’ obsessive fear of  national betrayal, it also worked to erode the 
legitimacy of  German rule as such.
The case of  Alsace-Lorraine in the First World War thus reveals the multiple limi-
tations of  early twentieth-century German imperialist nationalism.81 As this article 
has demonstrated, the German parliament and local civilian actors were able to put 
limits on the escalation of  state-led violence against the civilian population in the final 
phase of  the war. From the spring of  1917, the number of  arrests and expulsions de-
creased markedly, and a significant number of  people were granted permission to re-
turn to their homes. Yet these attempts to moderate wartime policies did not restore 
the credibility and legitimacy of  German rule in Alsace-Lorraine, as they left the au-
thoritarian nationalist doctrine unchanged. Aggravated by the failure of  the German 
government to improve the material lot of  the population and the continuing efforts of  
Germanization in other areas, the more lenient administrative approach had a disinte-
grative rather than a stabilizing effect. It was less, not more, repression that would fuel 
mass disaffection with German rule towards the end of  the war.
More generally, the case of  Alsace-Lorraine demonstrates that in sensitive areas such 
as borderlands, protective custody and other emergency measures can cause widespread 
national disaffection, undermine the state’s legitimacy and, depending on the circum-
stances, threaten its territorial control of  the area. Policymakers in conflict-ridden re-
gions such as Catalonia, Kashmir or Hong Kong, to name but a few, are well-advised 
to weigh very carefully the political risks of  abolishing civil liberties and the rule of  law 
in the attempt to keep recalcitrant populations under control. As in Alsace-Lorraine, in 
these regions the populations are characterized by multilayered identities that their na-
tional governments tend to perceive as a challenge to national unity. And as in Alsace-
Lorraine, in these regions attempts to enforce national unity by declaring a state of  
emergency or martial law may have the adverse effect of  mass disaffection with the 
larger nation. In a wider historical perspective, the case of  twentieth-century Germany 
suggests that what may be needed in such cases is a more fundamental change in au-
thoritarian nationalist doctrine rather than either the intensification of  emergency 
measures or half-hearted reform efforts.
 81 On the strong historical connections between nationalism and imperialism see recently P. Kolstø, ‘Is Imperialist 
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Abstract
When the First World War broke out, the French government declared the return of Alsace-Lorraine its only 
public war aim, arguing that the population was ‘French in spirit’. In an age rife with claims of national 
self-determination, trapped in a protracted war of attrition and facing a nationally ambivalent population, 
the German state soon came under enormous pressure to ensure the loyalty and patriotism of the inhabit-
ants of its western borderland. This article examines why Imperial Germany failed to meet this ‘stress test’. 
It focuses on the crucial but hitherto neglected issue of protective custody (Schutzhaft), whereby police 
and military authorities were able to arrest and detain ‘suspect’ civilians without charge or trial. The article 
finds that protective custody, an emergency measure under martial law, played a central role in the failure 
of German policy in Alsace-Lorraine: it undermined the rule of law, shifted the focus onto national dissent 
and gave rise to an atmosphere of suspicion and fear. The article also demonstrates that the Reichstag 
successfully put limits on protective custody in the second half of the war. Yet leaving the authoritarian 
doctrine of enforcing national loyalty in place, the more lenient administrative approach had a disintegra-
tive rather than a stabilizing effect, preparing the ground for widespread disaffection with German rule 
months before the war ended.
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